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LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF "CAPITAL STOCK"
J. GORDON GOSE*
"The capital stock of banks," said the celebrated early American
jurist, Judge Story, in a case decided in 1824, "is to be deemed a
pledge or a trust fund for the payment of the debts contracted by the
bank. The public, as well as the legislature, has always supposed this
to be a fund appropriated for such purpose. The charter relieves [the
shareholders] of personal responsibility and substitutes the capital
stock in its stead. Credit is universally given to this fund by the public,
as the only means of repayment. During the existence of the corpora-
tion it is the sole property of the corporation, and can be applied only
according to its charter, that is as a fund for the payment of its
debts..."'
It is exceedingly doubtful that any portion of this classic statement
was accurate in law or in fact when made, if taken literally. It is certain
that this language does not accord with legal terminology or with
corporate and business practices of the present time. The decision has,
nevertheless, for more than 130 years had tremendous influence in
confusing the meaning, in law and business, of the familiar expressions
"capital" and "capital stock." Except for occasional statutory defini-
tions these expressions have generally been defined either in terms of
metaphor or in terms which themselves require definition.
Thus, the Washington corporation statute, as it stood for many years
before the adoption of the present corporation act in 1933, contained
numerous provisions in which the words "capital stock" appeared.
Typical of these were requirements that the "amount of its capital
stock" shall be stated in the corporation's articles of incorporation; 2
no corporation shall commence business "until the whole amount of
* Professor. University of Washington School of Law
,3 Mason 308, Fed. Cas. No. 17, 944 (Cir. Ct., Dist Me. 1824).
2 Rem. Rev. Stat. § 3805.
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its capital stock has been subscribed";' amendments may be made to
the articles of incorporation by a "vote... of two-thirds of the capital
stock"; 4 corporations have power to own "shares of the capital stock
of any other corporation."5
In greater detail and under the more specific heading of "Capital
Stock-How Reduced" the pre-1933 Washington statute stated:
It shall not be lawful for the trustees to make any dividend except
from the net profits arising from the business of the corporation, nor
divide, withdraw, or in any way pay to the stockholders, or any of them,
any part of the capital stock of the company, nor to reduce the capital
stock of the company unless in the manner prescribed in this chapter,
or the articles of incorporation or by-laws; and in case of any viola-
tion of the provisions of this section, the trustees, under whose admin-
istration the same may have happened, except those who may have
caused their dissent therefrom to be entered at large on the minutes of
the board of trustees at the time, or were not present when the same
did happen, shall, in their individual or private capacities, be jointly or
severally liable to the corporation and the creditors thereof in the event
of its dissolution, to the full amount so divided, or reduced, or paid out:
Provided, that this section shall not be construed to prevent a division
and distribution of the capital stock of the company which shall remain
after the payment of all its debts upon the dissolution of the corporation
or the expiration of its charter: Provided, further, that in the case of
corporations whose stock is wholly or partly without any nominal or
par value, the provisions of this section shall not apply to so much of
the capital stock as is represented by such non-par-value stock, except
in the amount of the designated "Initial Non-Par Capital." The rights
of creditors shall not be limited by the provisions of this section."
The former statute also dealt with "increase or decrease of capital
stock" in these terms:
Any company incorporated under this chapter may, by complying
with the provisions herein contained, increase or diminish its capital
stock to any amount which may be deemed sufficient and proper for the
purposes of the corporation; but before any corporation shall be
entitled to diminish the amount of its capital stock, if the amount of its
debts and liabilities shall exceed the sum to which the capital is pro-
posed to be diminished, such amount shall be satisfied and reduced so
as not to exceed the diminished amount of the capital...7
The foregoing statutory excerpts and the quotation of Judge Story's
3 Rem. Rev. Stat. § 3803.
4 Rem. Rev. Stat. § 3805.
5 Rem. Rev. Stat. § 3810.6Rem. Rev. Stat. § 3823.7 Rem. Rev. Stat. § 3830.
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remarks in Wood v. Dummer are representative of innumerable similar
statements in statutes, court decisions and legal literature. Although
these particular statutes have been superseded and the views advanced
in Wood v. Dummer have been largely qualified or abandoned, the
language of these statutes and that decision continue to color and cloud
the meaning of "capital stock." On even casual examination, it will
appear that the words "capital stock" have been used in different
senses at different times and have often been used with no very clear
meaning at all. On closer examination, it becomes evident that three
possible meanings are involved in the usages most frequently employed.
These regard "capital stock" as meaning (1) the "shares" held by the
beneficial owners of the corporation; or (2) some or all of the property
of the corporation; or (3) an "amount" stated in dollars and which
initially bears some relation to the value of the consideration which
the corporation has received or should under the law have received for
its shares.
The purpose of this article is to clarify, if possible, these different
meanings. In essence, it will be shown that the first meaning, that is,
"capital stock" in the sense of "shares", while possibly technically
inaccurate is practically unimportant; second, that the concept of
"capital stock" as "property" or as a "trust fund" for creditors is, if
given a literal meaning, most inaccurate, confusing and unnecessary;
and third, that the concept of "capital stock" as an "amount", is the
only usage which is useful and correct under the present Washington
statute.
The ground to be covered has been plowed before but on the whole
the wilderness has proved stronger than the plowman. Vague and con-
flicting usages have become so much a part of the language of both law
and finance that it -is doubtful that confusion will ever be entirely erad-
icated. This article is just another effort to clear away the weeds
sown by the collective labors of courts, legislators and financiers.
"CAPITAL STOCK" IN THE SENSE OF "SHARES"
Quite obviously the words "capital stock" are surplusage when used
in the common phrase "shares of capital stock." The ultimate owners
of the corporate enterprise have shares in the entire venture. When
it is said that a man owns ten shares of X corporation, the nature and
extent of his holding have been just as completely described as if it
had been said that the same man owned ten shares of the "capital
stock" of the same corporation. Not only is the first statement shorter
19571
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
than the second; it also more directly focuses attention on the essen-
tial fact, that is, that the man owns a part of the whole venture. If the
addition of the words "capital stock" conveys any idea at all, it is
likely to be the entirely inaccurate one that the shares are in some
limited portion of the venture known as the "capital stock."
In recognition of these self-evident propositions, several of the more
modern statutory revisions of corporation law consistently substitute
the word "shareholder" for "stockholder" and studiously refrain from
the use of the expression "shares of capital stock". The "Uniform
Business Corporation Act", adopted in Washington in 1933, is typical
of such acts in this regard.' The definitions section of this statute
carefully defines "shares"' and "capital stock""0 in terms which make
it entirely clear that the two are not to be used in juxtaposition in the
sense of "shares of capital stock". Thus "shares" are defined as "the
units into which are divided the shareholders' rights to participate
in the control of the corporation, in its surplus or profits or in the
distribution of corporate assets." A "shareholder" is defined as one
"who owns one or more shares."" "Capital stock" is defined as an
"amount" in the sense to be dealt with hereinafter and in no sense as
defining the shares themselves.' Although this statute has been a
part of the law of the state for nearly a quarter of a century, it is
doubtful that the effort of the Uniform Law Commissioners in the
direction of linguistic precision has made any real impression on the
bench and bar. Certainly it made no impression on the sponsors and
the legislators concerned with the 1947 amendment authorizing a
corporation to purchase its own shares. That amendment simply
copied the "shares of capital stock" language of the Delaware statute
from which it was derived."3
The phrase "shares of capital stock" has probably become a perma-
nent part of our financial and legal vernacular. While a case can
8 RCW, Title 23.
9 RCW 23.04.060.
10 RCW 23.04.100.
" RCW 23.04.070.
12 The text of the statutory definition (RCW 23.04.100) is: "'Capital stock.'
"The 'capital stock' of a corporation at any time is:
"(1) The aggregate amount of the par value of all allotted shares having a par
value, including such shares allotted as stock dividends; and
"(2) The aggregate of the cash, and the value of any consideration other than cash,
determined as provided in this title, agreed to be given or rendered as payment for all
allotted shares having no par value, plus such amounts as may have been transferred
from surplus upon the allotment of stock dividends in shares having no par value.
[1933 c 185 § 1, part; RRS § 3803-1, part]"Is RCW 23.08.080. Cf. DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 160.
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certainly be made for dropping the words "capital stock" from the
expression, no harm results if it is recognized that the extra words are
of no real import in law.
CAPITAL STOCK IN THE SENSE OF "PROPERTY" OR A "TRUST FUND"
It is perhaps impossible at the present time to say exactly what
Judge Story's entire concept of capital stock was at the time of the
decision of Wood v. Dummer. His language certainly indicates that he
thought that the "capital stock" constituted some identifiable part of
the corporation's property and that this part was held by the corpora-
tion in trust for its creditors. Actually such a view has never accorded
with the facts of corporate practice. The contributions of shareholders
to the corporation in exchange for their shares are not held by the
corporation in any separately identifiable fund. If such contributions
are made in cash, the money is expended in payment for services,
materials, equipment or other purposes necessary in the conduct of
the business. Thus in place of such money the corporation acquires
other assets which in turn are likely to be sold or changed in form.
The result is that in the course of conducting its business operations the
typical corporation acquires a variety of assets such as bank deposits,
accounts receivable, tangible personal property and real estate. It may
happen that some particular item of property such as land or a build-
ing or some specific item of personal property is held by the corpora-
tion in unchanged form for a long period of time. Such an item may
be loosely referred to as a capital asset. Nevertheless, the fact that
such an asset is held in its original condition is not due to any rule of
law, nor is it, by reason or any rule of law, a part of the "capital stock."
So far as the law is concerned, the corporation could at any time sell
such an asset and reinvest the proceeds in such a way as to make them
an unidentifiable part of the general assets of the corporation. The
fact that some part of the assets originally contributed by shareholders
may continue to be held in original form is a matter of coincidence
and not of law. No portion of such assets is legally identifiable as the
"capital stock."
It is equally manifest that no amount of property equal in value
to the so-called "capital stock" is held in trust for creditors in any
sense known to the law of trusts. The creditors of the corporation like
the creditors of a living person have all of the debtor's assets available
to satisfy their claims. The total assets are not held in trust by the
corporation. The corporation has the right, so far as its creditors
19571
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are concerned, to sell or give any assets to third persons or distribute
them to shareholders without violating any obligations known to the
law of trusts.
Legal limitations on such dispositions of its property by the corpora-
tion are based not on rules of the law of trusts but on the law of
fraudulent conveyances or upon the law of corporations.
Actually neither Wood v. Dummer nor innumerable decisions that
have quoted all or some of its picturesque language have been con-
cerned with specific property. On the contrary they have been con-
cerned with the collection of amounts owing from shareholders to the
corporation. The common characteristic of these cases is that instead
of there being any "assets" or "fund" held by the corporation, the
shareholder is sued because there is a shortage of assets. The courts
have conventionally spoken as though a fund, in the sense of assets,
existed when in fact the whole purpose of the proceeding was to obtain
such assets.
The situation in Wood v. Dummer was remarkably simple. The
corporation-a bank-was in the process of dissolution. The share-
holders distributed some of the assets among themselves without first
paying off the creditors. The action was brought to require them to
repay enough to take care of the claims of the creditors. All that was
necessary to support the action was a simple rule that on dissolution
the assets of a corporation must first be devoted to the payment of
the claims of the corporation's creditors and that only the amount
remaining is available for distribution to shareholders. The common
sense and justice of this rule are apparent and it requires no "capital
stock" or "trust fund" theory to support it. Even if the corporation
had an authorized capital stock of only $1.00 but had acquired assets
of $100,000.00 and incurred debts of $95,000.00, it could not on
dissolution pay more than $5,000.00 to its shareholders. The subor-
dinated position of the shareholders in such a case would not be refer-
able to the nominal "capital stock" of $1.00, nor to any "trust fund"
of that amount nor to any notion that "credit is universally given" to
the "capital stock." Rather it would be referable to a perfectly sensible
rule that the assets of a dissolving corporation are primarily to be
devoted to the payment of its debts.
Judge Story's "trust fund" theory would have more nearly
approached accuracy if he had stated that the "capital stock" consisted
of all of the assets rather than a figure stated in the corporation's
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charter. Actually he made it clear that by "capital stock" he meant
only the latter. However, even if "capital stock" is taken to mean all
of the assets which the corporation owns, it is clear that such assets
are not held in "trust" for creditors except in the most general sense
of that word. Actually the total assets are at the hazard of the entire
business just as the assets of a living debtor are at the hazard of his
business management. The so-called "trust" is intelligible only as a
shorthand expression for a body of rules which require, under certain
circumstances, that a shareholder make a specified minimum payment
to the corporation and which forbid, under certain circumstances, the
distribution of corporate assets to the shareholders. These rules are,
on the whole, quite arbitrary and quite independent of trust prin-
ciples. Today we properly identify them simply as rules of the law
of corporations.
The first of these rules concerns the nature and extent of the obliga-
tion of a shareholder who obtains his shares from the corporation on
original issue to pay for such shares. Stated otherwise it concerns the
obligation to put assets into the corporation. 4 Such an obligation, if
it exists, rests either on contract in the form of a stock subscription or,
alternatively, upon an arbitrary legal obligation to pay a minimum
amount for the shares. Comparatively speaking the courts had little
difficulty with the problem of enforcing stock subscriptions. These
have been treated as contracts. Such problems as have arisen have
been largely concerned with contract principles, such as offer and
acceptance and consideration. Some peculiar rules dependent in part
on the development of corporate law do exist, such as acceptance of
pre-incorporation subscriptions by the promoters of a corporation as
yet nonexistent 5 and limitation of the subscribers' obligation, after
insolvency of the corporation, to the pro-rata share necessary to meet
the corporation's debts." Basically, however, valid stock subscriptions
have constituted assets of the corporation like any other contractual
obligation owing to it. One who subscribes for shares at a price of
$50 or $100 or $150 a share can be required to pay that amount without
regard to the par value, if any, of the share. If, however, the promise
is to pay less than the par value of a share, the stock is said to be
"watered" to the extent of the difference between the amount promised
14 The second problem which concerns the limitations on the rights of shareholders
to take assets out of the corporation will be considered in the latter part of this article.
15 BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATroNs, §§ 190, 190a (rev. ed. 1946).
10 FLETCHER, CYCLoPEDIA CORPORATIONS, § 1825 (1931).
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and par value.l The question is then presented whether the share-
holder is required to pay the deficiency to the corporation or its
credit6rs.
At the present time this does not seem to be a difficult question, but
for approximately a century following the decision of Wood v. Dummer
it plagued and puzzled courts, legislatures and lawyers.' Today there
seem to be simple and reasonable arguments on both sides of the
question with the choice of answer largely resting on policy considera-
tions. Thus, on the one hand, it seems reasonable that as a condition
to attaining the benefits of limited liability a shareholder should be
required by law to pay some minimum amount for his shares, such
minimum to be designated as par value." In opposition it can be plaus-
ibly maintained that no useful purpose is served by requiring any
minimum amount per share and that the important thing is to focus
attention of investors and shareholders alike on corporate assets rather
than artificial standards like par value. This argument is developed
by the assertion that "watered stock" liability is confused and complex
and can well be supplanted by a simpler rule which requires an original
shareholder to pay no more for his shares than the amount agreed
upon by him and the corporation. These were in substance the argu-
ments which led to the relatively modern introduction of non-par
shares into the law of corporations.19 Although these opposing argu-
ica For purposes of brevity the expression "watered shares" or "watered stock"
has been used to designate any par value shares which have been originally issued for
less than par value. In this context it includes "bonus shares" which are issued for no
separate consideration along with some other purchased security, such as a preferred
share or a bond; "discount shares" which are issued for an agreed money consideration
less than par; and shares issued for property worth less than par value.
17 Perhaps the best known criticism of Wood v. Dummer is found in Hospes v.
Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117, 15 L.R.A. 470 (1892).
Judge Mitchell, the author of the opinion in that case, clearly demonstrated that there
was no true "trust fund" arising out of shareholders' obligations to put assets into the
corporation. For the "trust fund theory," he substituted a "fraud" or "holding out"
theory under which only those creditors who relied, actually or presumptively, could
assert claims against shareholders. While Judge Mitchell's criticism of Wood v.
Dummer is largely valid, his own theory proceeds on the equally questionable premise
that "The capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit." Further the confusion
occasioned by distinguishing between creditors who have actually or presumptively
relied seriously complicates the procedural aspects of shareholders' liability.
18 Early corporate charters and statutes do not usually contain the words "par value."
The charters usually state a total amount, such as $100,000.00 divided into shares of
$100.00 each. The current practice of calling the latter "par value" seems to have
appeared in statutes and charters at a relatively late date.
19 Ballantine, Non-Par Stock-Its Use and Abuse, 57 AM. L. REv. (1923); Bon-
bright, The Dangers of Shares Without Par Value, 24 COLUm. L. REV. 449 (1924) ;
Berle, Problems of Non-Par Stock, 25 COLUm. L. REv. 43 (1925) ; Morawetz, Shares
Without Nominal or Par Value, 26 HARV. L. REv. '729 (1913); Wickersham,The
Progress of the Law or No Par Value Stock, 37 HARV. L. REv. 464 (1924) ; Rice &
Harno, Shares With No Par Value, 5 MINN. L. Rv. 493 (1921) ; Israels, Problems of
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ments seem quite obvious, neither courts nor legislatures evolved the
law of watered stock in any such direct terms. Instead of determining
a basic rule of policy in light of desirable practical objectives, the
rules of "watered stock" liability were imperfectly tortured out of
vague and misconceived notions of "capital stock" and "trust funds"
and "holding out" and "fraud." The bald assertions of Wood v.
Dummer that the "capital stock" is a "trust fund" to which "credit is
universally given" by the creditors "as the only means of repayment"
became the basis for holding shareholders obligated to pay at least the
par value of their shares.
Had the problem been a simple one, the language of Wood v.
Dummer would not perhaps have caused too much difficulty. Actually,
however, any discussion of shareholders' obligations to make contri-
butions to the corporation soon gets into a number of technical com-
plications. These complications present difficulties even if the problem
is clearly understood. When approached from the vague and unsound
premises of Wood v. Dummer, the law of watered stock inevitably
became largely unintelligible. Worse yet, the "trust fund" theory of
Wood v. Dummer started a vicious circle. Just as that doctrine con-
fused the law of "watered stock", conversely the "watered stock" cases
by repeated quotation of Judge Story's remarks concerning "capital
stock" confuse that expression to a point almost beyond repair.
It is not the purpose of the present article to explore the morass of
the watered stock cases.2" Suffice it to say that the "trust fund theory"
of Mr. Justice Story has been followed, rejected, modified, qualified
and criticized. The rule has been affected by statutes, themselves
frequently vague or metaphorical. The primary "trust fund" doctrine
has become entangled in procedural rules. It encountered complica-
tions arising from the valuation of property taken in payment for
shares. It became lost in distinctions between creditors who gave credit
knowing of the stock watering and creditors who had no such knowl-
edge. It foundered on the shoal of Handley v. Stutz, in which the
Par and No-Par Shares: A Reappraisal, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 1279 (1947). A comparison
of the last of these articles with the earlier ones will clearly show the changes which
have developed in both theory and practice of corporate finance over the last half
century. Some of the comments and predictions of the earlier writers seem naive at the
present time.
" In addition to Wood v. Dummer, note 1, supra, and the Hospes case, note 17,
supra, the following are typical: Adamant Mfg. Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac.
415 (1897), the leading Washington case; Lantz v. Moeller, 76 Wash. 429, 136 Pac.
687 (1913); Johns v. Clother, 78 Wash. 602, 139 Pac. 755 (1914); Gordon v. Cum-
mings, 78 Wash. 515, 139 Pac. 489 (1914) ; DuPont v. Ball, 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 Atl. 39,
7 A.L.R. 955 (1918) ; Eastern National Bank v. American B. & T. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 732,
64 Atl. 917 (1906) ; Brockett v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co., 81 F.2d 949 (8th Cir., 1936).
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Supreme Court permitted stock watering because the corporation could
not, after a period of losses, sell its remaining unissued par value shares
at par." We are not, however, concerned directly with this agonizing
struggle but rather with demonstrating that "capital stock" is not, as
the watered stock cases suggest, "property" or a "trust fund" or the
basis of the corporation's credit.
It has already been pointed out that the assets of a corporation are
not unchanging. It is also apparent that a creditor who extends credit
on the basis of any intelligent investigation does not, except at the
beginning of the corporation's life, rely on the original assets. No
intelligent creditor would ever proceed upon the theory that the
amount stated in the articles of incorporation as the total par value
of all authorized shares, even if fully paid in when the corporation was
formed, would thereafter indefinitely remain as assets of the corpor-
ation. It seems impossible that judges ever could have entertained
the view that creditors actually relied upon a figure written into a
corporate charter as indicative of the worth of the corporation. Never-
theless we find jurists of unquestioned competence accepting Judge
Story's declaration of that proposition.
Thus Judge Dunbar, speaking in the leading Washington case of
Adamant Manufacturing Company v. Wallace," said:
If it [the corporation] were allowed to hold itself out as having a
capital stock of $100,000.00, when in reality the capital stock, which is
and must be, under the theory of law, assets in the hands of the
corporation, is worth only one half of that amount, the corporation is
to that extent doing business under false colors, and is obtaining credit
upon the faith of an estate which is purely fictitious.
Similarly the categorical premise of a trust fund received appar-
21 139 U.S. 417 (1890). In most of the early cases it was either required or assumed
that the corporation would obtain subscriptions for all of its authorized shares before
commencing business. Modern statutes usually do not contain such a requirement and
authorized shares are in practice frequently reserved for issue at a later time or times.
In the Handley case the original authorized shares were fully subscribed at par. Pur-
suant to authority contained in the charter, the number of authorized shares was
increased. The additional shares were issued for less than par. The court felt that
this was justified since buyers would not pay par because of the corporation's existing
financial troubles. The modem corporate lawyer would simply amend the articles of
incorporation to reduce par value or create non-par stock or create a new class of
shares salable at par and thus avoid the stock watering problem. Apparently no such
device was available at the time of the Handley case. It is apparent that the rule of
that case undermines the reasoning behind both the "trust fund" and "fraud" theories,
that is, that the "capital stock" is the basis of the corporation's credit since under the
Handley rule there could be a substantial lawful watering of the "capital stock" upon
which the creditors are said to rely.
22 Note 20, supra.
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ently literal acceptance. Thus, in Sanger v. Upton," the Supreme
Court of the United States said:
The capital stock of an incorporated company is a fund set apart
for the payment of its debts.
While the authors of these opinions did not point to any assets
identifiable as "capital stock", their language suggests the possibility
of doing so. Actually of course, the "capital stock" as used in a cor-
porate charter can refer only to the amount of assets contributed or
required by law to be contributed by the shareholders on original
issue of their shares by the corporation. Such contributions are to the
corporation what seed is to a farmer. Just as the latter's creditors will
not realistically extend credit solely on the amount or quality of the
farmer's seed, corporate creditors will not long give credit on the basis
of shareholder contributions. Just as the seed will not remain in its
original form but will sprout and bear increase or wither and vanish,
so will the original contributions of shareholders change and increase
or decline or disappear.
On any critical analysis it must be true that the real basis of a
shareholder's obligation to pay a minimum amount for his shares must
rest not on the reliance of the creditor on the perpetual existence of
that amount in the coffers of the corporation, but on a more arbitrary
requirement that the law imposes; that is, that to achieve limited
liability he must put into the corporation the amount of "seed" which
is equal in value to the par value of shares he has taken or promised
to take. In other words, the cases holding a shareholder liable on
"watered stock" rest on the premise that creditors, unless personally
estopped from complaining, can call on the shareholders to put into a
venture a minimum amount that the law requires if such payment is
necessary to discharge the creditor's claim.
Wood v. Dummer and the many decisions which follow it in whole
or in part have much greater faith in the original capitalization of the
corporation than the facts warrant. Today, creditors probably rely
primarily on two other factors, the assets and the debts of the corpor-
ation. From these factors plus the amount of the original agreed
"capital stock", the conventional corporation balance sheet is con-
structed. This is critically examined by the careful creditor or the
credit rating agency which he consults. The item "capital stock"
appearing thereon does not indicate specific property. It indicates
23 91 U.S. 56 (1875).
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rather an amount of money or property which is at least as great as
the par value of issued par value shares and at least as great as some
part of the value of consideration received by the corporation on the
issue of non-par shares. This amount acts in a sense as a "brake" upon
the distribution of corporation assets to shareholders. Its effectiveness
in that regard will be examined in the next section of this article.
This "capital stock" amount connotes corporate assets only in that
it indicates (1) that the corporation supposedly did receive from its
shareholders for their shares at least that sum and (2) that if it did
not receive such amount, it may be possible, depending on the refine-
ments of the law of the corporation's domicile, to require the default-
ing shareholders to pay the deficiency to the corporation or to its
creditors. In the latter sense, the "capital stock" may be regarded as
an asset, contingent upon a subsequent determination that the share-
holders have not fully paid the par value of the shares held by them.
It is unfair to condemn without qualification the reasoning of the
judges who developed the trust fund theory. Commencing with Wood
v. Dummer, they were faced with the task of developing corporation
law out of almost nothing. The whole area of commercial law is
relatively modern and corporation law is particularly so. In Wood v.
Dummer, Judge Story appears to have been working almost entirely
from the terms of a corporate charter granted by the Massachusetts
legislature. There was no general corporation statute in existence in
Massachusetts at that time.2" Likewise, there was very little common
law of corporations. Charters granted by legislatures were frequently
quite brief. The general practice was to specify a total amount of
capital stock in dollars divided into shares of a specified dollar amount
each. Such charters generally said nothing concerning the legal sig-
nificance of these values. Consequently the rights and obligations of
the corporation and its shareholders and the rights of creditors had to
be worked out in conditions approaching a vacuum. Even when legis-
lation of a general character developed, it generally was not complete
and detailed.2" Also, legislation was by no means uniform, thus
adding to the confusion. It is, therefore, not surprising that judges
attempted to reason from familiar principles of the common law and
of equity. In applying such principles they appear to have been handi-
capped by lack of understanding of business and accounting practices,
24 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 9 (rev. ed. 1946).
25 This statement is particularly true with respect to share structures and related
problems such as "capital stock liability," "surplus," asset valuation and similar matters
entering into the legal-accounting area.
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the latter being largely undeveloped before the twentieth century. It
is also probably true that judges have not been drawn generally from
the commercial world or from the ranks of corporation lawyers. Faced
with the phenomenon of a rapidly developing field of law, judges and
lawyers sensed a necessity for some rules which would define share-
holder responsibility and would protect corporate creditors. The con-
fusion which developed from the efforts to work out these rules was
perhaps unavoidable in light of the revolutionary changes in business
which occurred during the nineteenth century.
CAPITAL STOCK IN THE SENSE OF AN AMOUNT
"Capital stock" as an "amount" generally suggests a figure appearing
over withdrawal of corporate assets by shareholders. The fundamental
idea was that only the excess of assets over the sum of the original
much to focus attention on "capital stock liability" and to aid in under-
standing its significance. In a vague way, however, the law, both
decisional and legislative, recognized and sought to give legal signifi-
cance to this meaning at an early date. It simply remained for later
judges and legislators to state these principles more completely and
accurately, a process which is still incomplete.2"
The legal result sought from this "capital stock" concept was control
over withdrawal of corporate assets by shareholders. The fundamental
idea was that only the excess of assets over the sum of the original
investment and claims of creditors should be distributable as dividends.
This concept can be simply illustrated. Suppose a poker player buys
$20.00 in chips. Later he borrows $10.00 in chips from another player.
Assume a rule that he could never put any chips in his pocket unless,
after doing so, he still had $30.00 on the table. Translated into cor-
poration law, the same principle permits shareholders to receive a
dividend (or other form of distribution essentially equivalent to divi-
dends) only to the extent that the assets exceed the amount of the
original investment required to be made in shares plus the amount of
the corporation's debts." This rule is conventionally abbreviated in
21 Some of the more modem corporation statutes recognize the existence of a variety
of meanings for "capital stock" and accordingly use some different expression to denote
the "amount" which appears on the balance sheet. Thus the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act prepared by the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law employs the words "stated capital" in place of "capital stock." The
California Corporations Code likewise uses "stated capital." The substitution seems
desirable, but it may prove difficult to induce lawyers and judges to pay attention to
statutory definitions. There is always a tendency to continue the use of familiar
terminology.
'7 For purposes of brevity, the word "debts" as used in this article comprehends all
liabilities of the corporation to third persons.
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modern law to the statement that a corporation can lawfully pay divi-
dends only "out of surplus." 8
It thus becomes apparent that there are three factors to be consid-
ered in determining the legality of a dividend-assets, debts and
"capital stock." Although the rule as stated is simple if applied to
facts as elementary as the poker example, the actual complications of
corporation finance sometimes make it difficult in application. The
valuation, in precise amount, of assets other than cash presents obvious
difficulties. The amount of debts may to a considerable extent be quite
certain but there are frequently unliquidated or contingent claims
which will vary the result. It is not, however, the purpose of this
article to explore the complexities of calculating a dollar value for assets
and liabilities. Rather its purpose is to examine the "capital stock"
factor in the equation. Three questions are presented: (1) how is the
amount of "capital stock" originally calculated; (2) how can it be
changed; and (3) what are its practical consequences?
In the simplest type of case, the calculation of "capital stock" is
as simple as the poker game example. If, in the early period of cor-
poration law, the corporation was organized with a "capital stock" of
$100,000.00 divided into shares of $100.00 each, and all was subscribed
and paid in,29 the "capital stock" would be $100,000.00. The same
would have been true if subscribed and not paid in. On principle it
might seem that the same should have been true if the entire 1,000
shares had been taken for $40.00 a share with an understanding
between the corporation that no more should be payable. The stock
then would be "watered" to the extent of $60,000.00 but its "amount"
would still be $100,000.00. However, a New Jersey case," held in
effect that the "capital stock" for purposes of determining legality of
a dividend was limited to the amount actually paid in or subscribed.
A somewhat similar problem would exist if the corporation took
28 Since surplus is simply an amount and not any separately identifiable part of the
corporation's assets, dividends are paid with the corporation's money resources. The
payment reduces assets and by so doing automatically reduces the amount of surplus.
The correct statement would be that dividends can lawfully be paid up to the amount
of an existing surplus. However, the figurative statement that dividends can be paid
only "out of surplus" is now deeply embedded in legal and financial language.
29 Early corporation laws frequently required that all of the shares be subscribed
for before the corporation could commence business. The pattern at the present time
requires subscriptions in nominal amount only. For example, the Washington statute
only requires that each incorporator subscribe for one share (RCW 23.12.020) and
that, as a condition to commencing business, the corporation have paid in capital in
such amount as may be fixed by its articles, which amount may be as low as $500.00
(RCW 23.08.030).30 Goodnow v. American Writing Paper Co., 73 N.J.Eq. 692, 69 Atl. 1014 (1908),
affirming 72 NJ.Eq. 645, 66 Atl. 607 (1907).
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$40,000.00 in property for $100,000.00 in par value stock. In that
case the question would be complicated by a further one, that is,
whether the valuation placed by the corporation on such property is
conclusive."
Modern statutes3 2 have quite generally simplified computation of
"capital stock liability" on par value shares. The Washington statute
is typical. It says: "The 'capital stock' of a corporation at any time is:
(1) The aggregate amount of the par value of all allotted shares
having a par value, including such shares allotted as stock dividends;
and
(2) The aggregate of the cash, and the value of any consideration
other than cash, determined as provided in this title, agreed to be given
or rendered as payment for all allotted shares having no par value,
plus such amounts as may have been transferred from surplus upon
the allotment of stock dividends in shares having no par values.3 3
Parenthetically, it should be noted that this statutory definition does
not include any suggestion of "capital stock" as consisting of "shares"
or of being in any sense "assets" or a "trust fund." The Washington
statute uses "capital stock" only with the meaning specifically given
by this definition section, that is, as a dollar amount, except as one
amendment to the statute uses it in the sense of "shares."3
Reverting to the calculation under the statute, it will be seen that
if shares have a par value of $10.00 each, the number of "allotted
shares" (that is, shares issued or subscribed for) times $10.00 will
arbitrarily give the "capital stock" even though the shareholder may
have paid or agreed to pay exactly that amount or less or more per
share. If in such a case, he agreed to pay only $8.00 a share the stock
would be watered to the amount of $2.00 a share but capital stock
would be calculated at $10.00 a share. If he had paid $12.00 a share,
the only effect would be to create a paid in surplus calculated at $2
31 Overvaluation of property received considerable attention in the watered stock
cases, where the liability of the shareholder to the corporation was in issue. It has
received little attention in connection with its effect on capital stock as an amount.
But see the Goodnow case, note 30, supra. Overvaluation is irrelevant under many
modem statutes such as those hereinafter discussed.
32 No attempt will be made to cite or analyze any number of such statutes. The
discussion will center upon the Washington statute with comparative references to the
Model Business Corporation Act, prepared by the Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association and to the California Corporations
Code.
-9 RCW 23.04.100.
34 RCW 23.08.080. This is the 1947 amendment authorizing corporations to purchase
their own shares under certain conditions. The pertinent portions of this statute are
quoted and discussed at a later point herein.
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for each such share. The statutory formula is tied entirely to par value
and number of shares allotted.
The situation grows more complex when non-par shares are used.
The statute starts with the plan of having "capital stock" equal the
money value received on issuance of the non-par shares. It then recog-
nizes that it may be or should be possible to have a paid in surplus on
non-par shares. Since there is no ready-made formula, such as par
value, for determining how allocation between "capital stock" and
paid in surplus is to be made, that matter was specifically dealt with in
another section of the statute, RCW 23.24.010, as follows:
If, upon the allotment of shares having no par value, any part of
the consideration received by the corporation is to be treated as paid-in
surplus rather than as payment upon such shares, the incorporators,
shareholders or directors, as the case may be, who fix the amount of
cash or determine the value of other considerations so received, shall
at that time specify the proportion of such value that is to be consid-
ered as surplus and the proportion thereof that is to be considered pay-
ment for the shares.
Amounts of surplus paid in by shareholders shall be shown on the
books of the corporation as a separate item designated 'paid-in
surplus.
Another section, which must be read in connection with the fore-
going, is RCW 23.16.030, which, insofar as here material, provides in
substance that the issue price and the kind of consideration to be
taken for non-par shares shall be fixed by the incorporators as to pre-
incorporation subscriptions and by the shareholders or, if the articles
of incorporation so provide, by the directors as to post-incorporation
subscriptions.
It is of interest to note that non-par shares developed largely from
a desire to avoid the "trust fund theory" which rested on a dollar
value assigned to shares. The proponents of non-par shares originally
seem to have assumed that no dollar value would be attached to the
shares. Inevitably it became apparent that while watered stock prob-
lems could be avoided because no minimum amount need be paid for
non-par shares, a "capital stock" valuation was necessary if the pre-
vailing practice of limiting dividend distributions to the amount of
surplus was to continue. Surplus, which is the difference between assets
and the sum of debts and capital stock, can not be computed without
assigning a "capital stock" value to the no-par shares. The simplest
solution would have required that the entire value of the consideration
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received for no-par shares should be the amount of the "capital stock."
Such a simple rule would, however, have prevented the creation of
paid-in surplus on the issue of non-par shares while permitting such
surplus on the issue of par shares. Assuming 1,000 authorized shares
of the par value of $10 each and 1,000 shares of no-par stock, it would
be possible for the corporation to sell 600 shares of each at the time of
incorporation for $10.00 each and the remaining 400 shares of each at
a later time for $15.00 a share. The "capital stock" would, in the
absence of any permissible allocation as to the non-par shares between
capital stock and surplus, be $12,000.00 for the non-par as against
$10,000.00 for the par value shares. The difference of $2,000.00 would
appear as paid-in surplus on the issue of the par value shares. In
order to permit a similar division between capital stock and paid-in
surplus on non-par shares, the statute creates a power in the corpora-
tion's representatives to allocate the amount received as they see fit.
Since, however, no minimum part of the consideration must go to
"capital stock" as to non-par shares, the allocation possibilities are
wider than in the case of par shares. In the assumed case it would
have been possible to have allocated the price ($6,000.00) of the
original 600 non-par shares in the amounts of $800.00 or $2.00 a share
to "capital stock" and $5,200.00 or $8.00 a share to paid-in surplus.
Similarly an equally arbitrary allocation could be made of the $15.00
a share received for the block of 400 shares later issued, as, for example,
$1.00 per share to "capital stock" and $14.00 per share to paid-in
capital. It has been urged that such a possibility is dangerous, espe-
cially as to non-par preferred shares. Such shares could be issued at
$100.00 per share, redeemable at and holding a liquidation preference
of the same amount, and substantially all of such consideration could
be allocated to paid-in surplus. If, as in Washington, dividends could
lawfully be paid to the extent of paid-in surplus, it would be possible to
use the greater part of the amount paid by the preferred shareholders
for the payment of dividends upon common shares, thus draining off
funds apparently obtained to enable the corporation to develop and
carry on business. Although literal reading of the statutes might indi-
cate possibilities of the character just mentioned, no such case has as
yet been presented to the courts." In all probability any allocation so
8 Essentially the same scheme could be employed by using a very low par value for
preferred shares. For example a $1.00 par value preferred could be sold for $100.00
a share and given a redemption price and liquidation preference of the latter amount.
The only difference between this and the non-par share examDle is that the attention
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manifestly designed to defraud or endanger the rights of the preferred
shareholders and so dangerous to the welfare of the corporation would
be effectively defeated by the courts. Special rules such as the fiduciary
duties of controlling shareholders to the minority can be invoked to
meet extreme cases. 8 In actual practice, allocations between capital
stock and paid-in surplus have apparently been made in good faith
and on some logical basis.
"Capital stock" as an "amount" becomes more complicated upon
the declaration of a share dividend. Statutes vary somewhat, but in
the main provide that as to par value shares, "capital stock" must be
increased in the amount of the par value of the shares issued as a
dividend. On a dividend payable in non-par shares, it also seems neces-
sary to transfer something from surplus to distinguish the dividend
from a stock split.e " There must be a surplus against which the
increased amount of capital stock is charged. This may be an earned
surplus, a paid-in surplus or, in some states such as Washington, a
revaluation surplus obtained by writing up the value of the assets of
the corporation."' Laying aside for the moment, the possibility of
using a revaluation surplus, it is apparent that the transfer of a part
of paid-in or earned surplus to "capital stock" reduces the corpora-
tion's ability to pay a cash dividend. When it is further considered
that a dividend paid in common shares to common shareholders really
does nothing for the shareholder except to divide his shares into
smaller units, it follows, in principle, that the shareholder is worse
off after a stock dividend than he was before. He owns the same per-
centage of shares as he did before and the corporation has reduced
of the purchaser is more likely to be directed to the large resulting paid-in surplus than
in the case of non-par shares.36 See RCW 23.32.060.
36a The only essential difference between a stock dividend and a stock split is that
the former involves a transfer from surplus to capital stock while the latter leaves both
these items unaffected. On a stock dividend the added shares are "paid for" by charging
surplus. On a stock split of par shares, the existing shares are divided into a greater
number of units and the par value is proportionally reduced. A stock split of non-par
shares simply creates more units which in the aggregate are represented by the "capital
stock" which arose on the original issuance of the non-par shares.
37 The Washington dividend statute (RCW 23.24.030) does not distinguish between
different types of surpluses except to forbid "cash or property" dividends on the basis
of a revaluation surplus. By necessary inference "cash or property" dividends may be
paid to the extent that any other type of surplus, such as paid-in, reduction or earned
surplus, exists. Some statutes place restrictions on paid-in and reduction surplus, e.g.
CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS CODE § 1500. Inconsistently the same section of that statute,
like the Delaware General Corporation Law § 170, permits "nimble dividends," i.e.
dividends payable from current earnings even though the corporation has a deficit
rather than a surplus.
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the amount available for payment of a cash dividend.38 However, this
theoretical consequence is seldom recognized in practice. Division of
the shares into smaller units frequently results in a higher unit price,
if the stock dividend is large enough to resemble a typical stock split
as for example a dividend of one share for each one outstanding. If
the dividend is a relatively small one, say one share for each twenty
shares outstanding, and the corporation subsequently pays the same
annual dividend on new and old shares, dilution of the outstanding
shares and freezing of a part of surplus is likely to be ignored as a
price factor with the result that each new and old share may have the
same if not a higher market price than formerly.
The revaluation surplus possibility contrasts with the usual rules
concerning cash dividends. While statutes are far from uniform, they
tend, like the Washington statute, to conform to accounting practice
by requiring conservative valuation of assets in calculation of a surplus
for cash by requiring dividend purposes. Carrying of inventory and
similar items at the lower of cost or market, elimination of unrealized
appreciation in values, depreciation write-offs, write-downs for bad
debts and contingencies are all designed to value the assets at the least
optimistic figure. If the valuation assigned to assets is written up and
the consequent increase in surplus is used to pay stock dividends, it
can be argued that no harm is done since the increased values cannot be
drawn off as cash dividends since they are now "frozen" into the capital
stock account. To make that view wholly accurate, it would be neces-
sary to forbid a subsequent corresponding reduction of capital stock
and a declaration of a dividend from the resulting reduction surplus.
Otherwise the total effect of four planned steps consisting of the upward
revaluation of assets, a stock dividend charged to resulting revaluation
surplus, reduction of capital stock and cash dividend charged to reduc-
tion surplus, would permit payment of a cash dividend initially unlaw-
ful. As will be seen when the statutes concerning reduction in capital
stock are considered, that possibility along with others has not been
considered in the Washington statute.
So much for the computation of "capital stock." In summary it
consists of the number of issued or subscribed par shares multiplied
by par value; the value of the consideration received for non-par
shares less amounts allocated to paid-in surplus; and transfers from
surplus, possibly including those from revaluation surplus, of the
38 No such freezing of surplus into "capital stock" occurs on a share split. See note
36a, mipra.
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necessary par value of the dividend shares or whatever amount the
directors may order on a dividend payable in non-par shares."
Along with these elaborate provisions for fixing the amount of "cap-
ital stock", statutes have also customarily provided for its reduction.
It would naturally be anticipated that having so carefully provided
for a "capital stock" as a protection for creditors, strong safeguards
would surround its reduction. Such has not always been the case.
Probably the failure to give a greater amount of protection has been
due more to a lack of understanding than to any deliberate disposition
toward laxity.
The general pattern of corporation statutes has been to permit
reduction of capital stock by vote of some substantial percentage of
shareholders. Such statutes generally contain provisions intended to
protect creditors. The earliest Washington statute4 ' was enacted in
1866. This was a very highly developed statute for that early date. It
forbade the reduction of the capital stock to an amount less than the
amount of the outstanding debts unpaid when the reduction became
effective. At this juncture it should be noted that reduction of the
"capital stock" alone cannot possibly be of the slightest harm to any-
one unless reduction is construed to include an accompanying distribu-
tion of corporate assets to shareholders. For example, if a corporation
merely reduces par value of all outstanding par shares from $100.00 to
$50.00 a share, the effect is to reduce "capital stock" to one-half of
its former amount. If nothing more occurs, the creditors have just as
many assets as before available to satisfy their claims and the share-
holders have just as many assets as before working for them. ° The
real significance of the change is its effect of increasing surplus or
reducing a deficit. In fact by this process an existing deficit may be
wiped out and a surplus may appear in its place. Any increased or new
surplus would then be available for dividend purposes. Similarly any
39 Statutes often provide for the increase of "capital stock" by action which directs
a transfer from surplus to capital stock without any corresponding issuance of shares.
See CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS CoDE § 1900; MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, note
32, supra, § 2j. The Washington statute contains no such express provision. Query
whether an action so to capitalize surplus in Washington could be had over the objection
of a shareholder?
40 Laws of Washington, 1866, p. 55; (Volume 2, Pierce's Session Laws of Washing-
ton, p. 763, 768.) The text of the relevant section of the act (Sec. 20) is set forth
herein above footnote 7, supra.
40a The usual reason given for placing restraints on distributions of corporate assets
is protection of creditors. Such restraints also carry out the implied compact between
the shareholders that the corporation, if possible, will have a minimum amount of net
assets available at all times in order to accomplish its purposes. See Berks Broadcasting
Co. v. Cramer, 356 Pa. 620, 52 A.2d 571 (1947).
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reduction in deficit would put the corporation that much closer to
acquiring a surplus from subsequent operations. The real matter of
concern to existing creditors lies in the newly created ability to declare
dividends from the reduction surplus arising from the reduction of
"capital stock". The practical significance of the 1866 statute therefore
lay in the fact that it prevented the withdrawal of assets on a reduction
of the capital stock unless the assets remaining after such reduction
had a value twice as large as the debts.
The following example demonstrates the operation of the 1866
Washington statute. The restraining formula is that capital stock shall
not be reduced to less than the amount of the debts. Suppose that
assets are $100,000.00, debts $25,000.00 and capital stock $75,000.00.
As of that moment assets are in a ratio of 4 to 1 to debts, a most com-
fortable protection. Suppose the corporation reduces "capital stock"
to $26,000.00. A reduction surplus of $49,000.00 at once appears. A
dividend of $49,000.00 is at once declared and paid. Assets of
$51,000.00 are now left to cover $25,000.00 in debts. This is slightly
more than a 2 to 1 ratio of assets to liabilities, the minimum possible
under the statute. This might seem to be an ample margin of protec-
tion but it is quite possible that the dividend would have taken all
the liquid assets leaving only those less suitable for the payment of
debts.
The 1866 statute remained in effect until 1933. In that year the
present corporation statute, then known as the Uniform Business
Corporation Act, was adopted. As already noted, that act defined
"capital stock" as an amount. The dividend sections employ this
amount as a factor in the calculation of surplus available for dividends.
On the whole these dividend sections reveal an awareness of the
accounting, legal and practical problems involved in distributions to
shareholders. As much cannot be said for the section authorizing
reduction of capital stock. Whereas the dividend sections impose quite
effective restraints on normal dividends, the reduction section is in
some degree unintelligible and if literally followed can destroy the
protection given by the dividend sections. The reduction section is as
follows:
The capital stock of a corporation may be reduced by a resolution
adopted by the vote of the holders of two-thirds of the voting power of
all shareholders, cast in person or by proxy at a meeting of the share-
holders duly called and held for that purpose, or by such vote as the
articles of incorporation require.
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Following the adoption of a resolution for the reduction of capital
stock, articles of reduction of capital stock shall be prepared and filed
in the manner required for the preparation and filing of articles of
amendment. The articles of reduction shall also state the financial con-
dition of the corporation and that the proposed reduction will not
reduce the fair value of the assets of the corporation to an amount less
than the total amount of its debts and liabilities plus the amount of its
capital stock as so reduced.
No attempted reduction of capital stock shall be effective until the
secretary of state has filed the articles of reduction and issued a certifi-
cate of reduction, and no such attempted reduction shall be valid, even
if the secretary of state has filed the articles of reduction, and issued a
certificate of reduction, and no such attempted reduction shall be valid,
even if the secretary of state has filed the articles of reduction, and
issued a certificate of reduction, if such reduction would reduce the
actual value of the corporate assets to an amount less than the total
amount of its debts and liabilities plus the amount of capital stock as so
reduced.4' (emphasis added)
The practical effect of this language is to permit reduction of assets
down to the point of equality with outstanding debts, that is to a
1 to 1 ratio. Actually it is necessary to do some violence to the statu-
tory language to get even this favorable a result for creditors. "Reduc-
tion of the capital stock" standing by itself will never "reduce" the
amount of assets. That will occur only when the reduction surplus
is distributed. It can therefore be argued that the statute when read
in light of the earlier statutory definition of capital stock,42 is mean-
ingless since "reduction of the capital stock" will never reduce the assets
to the extent forbidden by the statute or at all. It is unlikely, however,
that a court would thus hold the statute meaningless. More probably it
would be held, despite the resulting warping of the statutory definition,
that the reduction section means that no distribution of assets can be
made in connection with a capital stock reduction which would leave
less assets than specified by the statute. If we accept this as the only
possible construction of the statute (assuming it is to be given any
effect at all), the possible practical operation of the statutory rule can
be tested by the same hypothetical example used for the 1866 statute.
Thus, again suppose the assets to be $100,000.00, debts $25,000.00 and
capital stock $75,000.00. There being no surplus, no dividends can be
paid. Creditors have $100,000.00 available for their claims, a ratio
41 RCW 23.16.120.
42RCW 23.04.100.
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of assets to liabilities of 4 to 1. The shareholders then reduce the
capital stock to $1,000.00, thereby creating a surplus of $74,000. If
this amount is distributed, an extremely small margin of assets over
debts ($26,000.00 to $25,000.00) remains.4 2 a Thus the protection for
creditors under the 1933 statute is materially less than under the
statute in effect from 1866 to 1933.
Inasmuch as the dividend sections of the act carefully provide for
the "capital stock" cushion-the amount of the capital stock as a
minimum margin of assets over debts-it seems unlikely that the
draftsmen of the act could have intended that the "reduction of capital
stock" provisions would give so much freedom of action to the share-
holders. Nevertheless, no more exacting standard can be spelled out
of the section. If it be suggested that the statute does not expressly
authorize any distribution of reduction surplus, the answer is that
nothing in the entire act denies the right to distribute such a surplus
and, further, that RCW 23.16.120 is unintelligible if reduction surplus
is not distributable since a reduction of the amount of "capital stock"
without an accompanying distribution of assets could not possibly
reduce the assets. The wording of the statute is obviously defective,
but that scarcely warrants the substitution of language which might
be more desirable. That is a task for the legislature.
There has been considerable diversity of opinion as to what curbs
should be placed on the reduction of "capital stock." It has long been
an accepted view that some reduction should be permitted. The 1866
statute used a 2 to 1 ratio between assets and debts as the minimum
limiting factor by providing that capital stock could not be reduced
to a point below debts and liabilities.
There is much to be said in favor of such a ratio test, though opinions
might differ as to the proper ratio. It has also been suggested that a
ratio of assets to debts (or perhaps of current assets to debts) might
be a more satisfactory control than the "capital stock" cushion for all
dividends. In general, however, dividend statues have been tied to the
amount of the capital stock as selected by the corporation. The result
of this is that the minimum permissible ratio between assets and liabil-
ities has depended upon the capital structure of the particular corpor-
ation and not on any uniform fixed ratio. Thus a creditor who extends
credit to a corporation having a "thin" capital stock cannot complain if
42a The examples given in the text assume an existing surplus or, as in this last
example, an exact equality between assets on the one hand and debts plus capital stock
on the other. Obviously the statute also permits reduction to get rid of an existing
deficit even to the extent of creating a surplus in its place.
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the ratio of assets to laibilities is correspondingly small after the pay-
ment of dividends. If, on the other hand, there was a "thick" capital
stock cushion when credit was given, there is certainly substantial
reason for forbidding the reduction of the capital stock to a point where
distribution of the amount of the reduction surplus may leave a danger-
ously low proportion of assets to debts.
As previously noted, distribution of a reduction surplus, if uncon-
trolled, may drain off liquid assets which are most important from the
standpoint of creditors. This possibility also exists with respect to
ordinary dividends but is potentially more serious when distributions
of a reduction surplus are made because the latter may be so large,
under a statute such as the 1933 Washington statute, as seriously to
jeopardize the position of creditors.
The tenor of some of the more modern corporation statutes has been
to include several restraints on the distribution of reduction surplus.
For example, the Model Business Corporation Act,4" prepared by the
Committee on Business Corporations of the Corporation, Banking and
Business Law Section of the American Bar Association, classifies a
"reduction" surplus as a "capital surplus" and includes the following
limitations on distributions of such a surplus "in partial liquidation":
(1) no distribution permitted if the corporation is insolvent or will be
made insolvent thereby; (2) no distributions permitted if dividends
on preferred shares are in arrears except to pay such preferred divi-
dends; (3) no distributions permitted if the effect would be to reduce
the "net assets" (excess of assets over debts) to a point below the
liquidation preferences on preferred shares." The California statute"
contains more elaborate provisions restraining distributions. If there
is a class of preferred shares outstanding, reduction surplus may be
distributed only in payment of dividends upon or for redemption or pur-
chase of the preferred shares. If there are no such preferred shares,
distributions may be made to the common shareholders. In either
situation, however, there must be a ratio of assets to debts after pay-
ment in the proportion of 1% to 1.
As these modern statutes indicate, reduction of capital stock may be
dangerous to preferred shareholders as well as to creditors. Accord-
ingly protective provisions are included in them for such preferred
shares. In each case, these statutes, in addition to the provisions
43 Sections 40, 41, and 63.
44 Note 43, supra.
45 CALIF. CoRP,. CODE, §§ 1906, 1907. See also §§ 1500, 1501.
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already mentioned, categorically forbid reduction of the "capital stock"
to an amount less than the liquidation preferences of the preferred
shares.
A survey of these and similar modem statutes indicates the pro-
priety of including some statutory safeguards for the protection of
creditors and preferred shareholders. The present Washington statute
does not give such protection. However, it would no doubt be possible
for a court to enjoin or recapture any distribution of corporate assets
manifestly fraudulent as to creditors. The standards for such relief
would, however, never be quite as definite as the statutory limitations
of the Model Act or the California act, which are representative of the
modern statutory trend.,6
The technique of accomplishing reduction of capital stock requires
some consideration. Reduction may or may not involve amending the
articles of incorporation. If, for example, reduction is sought to be
accomplished by reducing the par value of the shares of the corpora-
tion, an amendment is seemingly necessary to effect the reduction.
The corporation statute requires that the par value of the shares be
stated in the articles. 7 Possibly it would be held that the articles of
reduction are in effect articles of amendment but such a conclusion is
at least debatable. A different situation exists if reduction is to be
accomplished by reduction of the number of outstanding common par
shares, that is, by having each shareholder surrender an equal propor-
tion of his shares. In a legal sense, no harm would result to the share-
holder since he has the same proportion of the common shares as he
had prior to surrender. Also the articles of incorporation are in no way
altered since the corporation is still authorized to issue the same number
of par value shares as before. "Capital stock" would then be reduced
solely by reducing the number of shares outstanding.
No amendment of the articles is necessary to reduce "capital stock"
as to non-par shares. "Capital stock" referable to such shares does not
depend on the articles of incorporation but on the amount received
for such shares and upon any allocation thereof which may have been
made between "capital stock" and paid-in surplus by action of the
incorporators, shareholders or directors." Consequently the simplest
way in which "capital stock" arising from non-par shares can be
reduced is by action aimed directly at the dollar amount determined
46 Notes 43 and 45, supra.
47 RCW 23.12.020(5).
48 RCW 23.04.100; 23.16.030; and 23.24.010. It is necessary to read all three of
these sections to understand the permissible allocation of the price of non-par shares.
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from the issue price as modified by the allocation, if any. The appro-
priate procedure would be to adopt a resolution reciting the present
amount of the "capital stock" and providing for its reduction from
that figure to such lower figure as may be desired. In Washington no
minimum figure is indicated so that the reduction could apparently be
made down to a nominal sum.
While an amendment is not at all necessary as to non-par reduc-
tions, it would be possible to accomplish that result by amendment,
as, for example, by changing 1,000 non-par shares having a current
"capital stock" amount of $100,000.00 to 1,000 shares having a par
value of $50.00 each, thus automatically reducing "capital stock" to
$50,000.00. A mere reduction of the issued number of non-par shares
or the amendment of the articles reducing the number of authorized
non-par shares and forcing a surrender of those outstanding in excess
of the newly authorized number would not in and of itself reduce the
"capital stock". Some direct action bearing on the dollar amount would
be necessary in such a situation.
There remains to be considered the place of treasury shares in the
computation of "capital stock". This subject has not been developed
by judicial decision and, until recently, had been quite ignored by
statute.
Treasury shares are those which have been once issued by the cor-
poration and later reacquired by it. Reacquisition may be by gift, or
in satisfaction of a debt owing from the corporation or by purchase.
A sharp split of authority developed in American corporation law over
the legality of a corporation's voluntary purchase of its own shares.
In a line of cases, 9 Washington followed the strict English view that
no such purchase could be made. These cases proceed on the theory
that the purchase, or to be more precise, the payment of the purchase
price effects a reduction of the capital stock and is illegal because not
accomplished in accordance with the statutory procedure for capital
stock reductions. The Washington rule forbade such purchases even
though the purchase price was less than an existing surplus available
for payment of dividends. The Washington cases considered col-
lectively are excellent examples of the failure of courts to develop any
49 Kom v. Cody Detective Agency, 76 Wash. 540, 136 Pac. 1155 (1913) ; State cX rel.
Howland v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138 Wash. 144, 244 Pac. 261 (1926); Schwab v.
Getty, 145 Wash. 66, 258 Pac. 1035 (1927) ; Duddy Robinson Co. v. Taylor, 137 Wash.
304, 242 Pac. 21 (1926) ; Big Bend Milling Co. v. Drake, 149 Wash. 666, 272 Pac. 39
(1928); First University Investment Corp. v. Roosevelt etc. Co., 170 Wash. 444, 16
P2d 820 (1932) ; Whittacker v. Weller, 8 Wn.2d 18, 111 P.2d 218 (1941).
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clear view of just what capital stock is. The court senses the fact that
a distribution of assets to a shareholder may be dangerous but fails to
note that no real harm is done if the capital stock cushion remains
unimpaired. The court could have fully protected the creditors by
holding in the purchase cases that such purchases would be valid if the
corporation had a surplus in excess of the purchase price and if the
"capital stock" in the sense of an amount would not be written down
on reacquisition of the share. If the corporation does not have a surplus
greater than the purchase price, the payment would be in the nature
of an unlawful dividend; if the par value of the reacquired share or
some dollar value referable to a repurchased non-par share is informally
deducted from "capital stock," the assertion that "capital stock" is
reduced contrary to the statutory procedure is correct. By requiring
surplus as a condition precedent to and forbidding informal writing
down of capital stock as a consequence of the purchase, objections to
the purchase are removed.
In 1947 the Washington legislature amended the 1933 act to author-
ize a corporation to purchase its own shares. The statute is almost
identical with that of Delaware and briefly deals with the problem
in the following language:
(2) Every corporation organized hereunder shall have the power
to purchase, hold, sell, and transfer shares of its own capital stock:
Provided, That no such corporation shall use its funds or property for
the purchase of its own shares of capital stock when such use would
cause any impairment of the capital stock of the corporation.50
An unfortunate aspect of this language is that it completely aban-
dons the 1933 statutory definitions covering "capital stock" and
restrains distributions of corporate assets in the vague old terminology
of "impairment of capital" rather than in modern terms of surplus.
It has, however, been held in Delaware that the prohibition against
"impairment of capital" is the same as a limitation of payments to
the amount of surplus. It can, therefore, be quite safely assumed that
the statute authorizes corporations to purchase shares to the extent
of any available surplus. 1
The statute is, however, silent as to the effect of the purchase on
"capital stock". It is obvious that if a corporation has a surplus of
$1,000.00 and, on the strength of this, buys ten of its own $100.00 par
shares for a total price of $1,000.00 the surplus will at once be reduced
10 RCW 23.03.080.
31 In re International Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 92 At. 255 (1914).
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to zero. If, however, the sum of $1,000.00 (the total par value of the
ten shares) is immediately deducted from "capital stock" a surplus
of $1,000.00 at once reappears. Such a practice would permit a corpor-
ation to use a small surplus to purchase an unlimited amount of its
shares. The process would be even more absurd if the purchase price
paid were less than par value since surplus would be increased with
every purchase. If the price paid were more than par, only a partial
ultimate reduction of surplus would occur. Furthermore, the repeated
subtraction of the par value of the repurchased shares from the
"capital stock" would accomplish a "reduction of capital stock" with-
out any of the safeguards usually required for such reduction. The
only reasonable conclusion is that "capital stock" should not be
reduced by repurchase but only by the method called for by the
"reduction" sections of the law or some special statutory provisions
designed to cope with the problem.sla
In the present condition of the Washington statute, the argument
for maintaining the same capital stock amount on a repurchase of
shares gets involved in a statutory triangle. At one corner is the
statutory definition of "capital stock" as an amount equal to the
"allotted" (issued or subscribed for) shares times the par value per
share." Treasury shares are certainly not "allotted" as that term is
generally understood and in this light should not be reflected in
capital stock. At the second comer of the triangle is the 1947 statute
which permits purchases only if there is no resulting "impairment of
capital stock", that is, only to the extent of a surplus." Obviously this
must mean a true surplus and not one which rises like the phoenix
from its ashes upon a deduction of the purchase price from capital
stock. Finally, at the third corner is the statute for the reduction of
"capital stock" giving a rather detailed procedure for the making of
such reduction.5" This procedure would be frustrated by use of the
purchase device for the same purpose. In this posture of affairs, the
only reasonable course is to read into the "capital stock" definition a
further requirement that the par value of repurchased shares remain
a part of "capital stock" until reduced in the statutory manner. If
non-par shares are repurchased the same philosophy should defeat any
attempt to short-cut the reduction statute.5"
Ga The California statute specifically requires the regular proceedings for reduction
of surplus before "stated capital" can be reduced with respect to treasury shares.
52 RCW 23.04.100.
53 RCW 23.08.080.
11 RCW 23.16.120.
11 Since non-par shares have no assigned dollar value, the retirement or cancellation
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It should also be noted that it is sometimes suggested that treasury
shares should be treated as assets of the corporation. They are in a
sense so treated so far as the watered stock problem is concerned.
Having once been paid for, they have been held to be reissuable at less
than par value." Actually, however, their value to the corporation is
no greater than authorized but unissued shares. To treat them as
assets is entirely unsound and such a practice would compound the
dangers discussed in the preceding paragraph.
CONCLUSION
Any exploration into the "capital stock" area can be continued
almost endlessly. The field is at least as wide as the far ranging
complexities of corporate financial structures extend. Such structures
have in recent years become increasingly involved and will continue
in that direction. Superimposed on the width of the problem, we have
a further complicating factor of vague or misused and misquoted
terminology. This terminology has come to us from business, account-
ing, finance, economics and law. Each group has no doubt played some
part in shaping and confusing the familiar terms discussed herein.
No attempt has been made to examine all aspects of the problem.
The problems of redemption of preferred shares have, for example,
been passed over though they certainly affect "capital stock" in a
significant way. The object of this article has been to direct attention
to some of the significant fundamental concepts concerning shares of
corporate stock, liabilities of shareholders to the corporation on original
issue and the basic legal and accounting concepts of "capital stock"
as a restraint on distribution of assets to shareholders. If the dis-
tinguishing fundamentals of these matters are clear and if it is under-
stood that decisions and statutes are not always wholly accurate or
exact in the use of "capital stock" and other legal-accounting term-
inology, solution of more specialized refinements of the basic problem
are not too difficult.
thereof could in no event have any automatic effect on "capital stock"[is BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, § 202 (rev. ed. 1946).
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